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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between income inequality and growth using panel data on 
Swedish counties from 1960-2000. Compared to standard methods of estimating this relationship yearly 
regional level data are used, and inequality is allowed to be endogenous. We find a significant positive impact 
of inequality on growth, but the magnitude of the effect decreases with the length of the growth period studied. 
When allowing income inequality to be endogenous, using a panel 2SLS IV estimation, we find positive effect 
of inequality on 1 to 5-year growth rates, when significant, whereas the effect on 10-year growth rates are not 
clear cut. 
 
Sammanfattning: Denna studie utforskar sambandet mellan inkomstojämlikhet och tillväxt baserat på 
paneldata på svenska län från 1960-2000. Till skillnad fran gängse estimationsmetoder i området används här 
årliga data på regionalnivå och inkomstojämlikheten tillåts vara endogent bestämd. Vi finner en signifikant 
positiv effekt av inkomstojämlikhet på tillväxt.  Storleken på effekten avtar dock med längden på 
tillväxtperioden. Den positiva effekten av inkomstojämlikhet på 1 till 5 års tillväxttakter kvarstar när 
inkomstojämlikhet tillåts vara endogen med en panel 2SLS IV estimation. Effekten på 10-års tillväxttakter blir 
dock inte entydiga. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
With the expansion of the welfare state, Sweden experienced a remarkable decrease in 
income inequality in the post-war era. As noted in Lindbeck (1997): “ Two broad targets of 
economic and social policy seem to have been taken more seriously in Sweden after World 
War II than in most other developed countries: economic security, including full 
employment, and egalitarianism, including both a general compression of income differences 
and the mitigation of poverty.” When looking at income distribution in terms of the Gini 
coefficient both within and across the Swedish counties, the evolution has been dramatic 
since the 1960s, as can be seen in figure 1.  
 













          Notes: The data is based on taxable individual income from the population aged 20 and 
over. Each line in the figure refers to a county. The Gini coefficient is an index 
between 0 and 1, and is a measure of inequality, in the sense that a larger index implies 
a larger degree of inequality, and vice versa. Source: Original data from Statistics 
Sweden, further revised and adjusted as explained in Appendix A 
Income inequality may be of interest in its own right or it may be relevant because of its 
perceived consequences. In light of the dramatic changes in income distribution in Sweden it 
is of interest to investigate what impact this decrease in inequality has had on economic 
growth in Sweden. Little has been done studying the Swedish experience in this context. 
The standard method of estimating the relationship between inequality and growth in the 
literature is to assume that inequality is exogenous in determining growth. Moreover, 
country-level data often forms the basis of these studies. Finally, averaging the data over five   3
or ten year periods is commonly applied. In this paper, we argue that all of these procedures 
are questionable and may have important drawbacks.  
 
This study explores the relation between inequality and income growth in Sweden based on 
county-level data from 1960 to 2000. The data on income inequality is based on taxable 
individual income for the population aged 20 years and above.
1 This study differs from the 
prior literature in several respects. We limit our analysis to counties within a country and can 
thus abstract from country heterogeneity. Moreover, our high quality yearly data on income 
distribution and growth enables us to study both the short run and longer run relationships 
between income inequality and growth. Furthermore we deal with the endogeneity problem 
of income inequality in the growth regression by estimating the growth regression using 
2SLS instrument variable estimation.  
  
When estimating a standard growth equation as a function of  inequality and standard control 
variables, our results indicate that inequality has a positive and decreasing effect on 1 to 10-
year average annual growth rates. When allowing for the endogeneity of the inequality 
variable using 2SLS IV estimator, including age structure as instrument variables, the 
magnitude of the inequality coefficient remains positive in the 1-5 year growth period, 
whereas the effects on the 10 year growth rates are not as clear cut.    
 
In what follows, section II presents a brief survey of economic theory about the relation 
between inequality and growth. Section III discusses three issues relating to the empirical 
design of the inequality growth relationship. The data as well as an overview of the 
development of inequality during the period studied is presented in Section IV, followed by 
the empirical specification in section V. The results are presented in section VI. The last 
section summarises and provides some concluding discussion. 
 
II.  Positive or negative relation between inequality and growth: a 
brief literature survey. 
 
In the 1950s, Kuznets (1955) developed the idea that during a country’s transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy, inequality would first rise and then fall back, giving 
                                                 
1 The data is from Statistics Sweden and has been compiled and further adjusted by Mats Johansson, Institute for 
Future Studies. See Appendix A.   4
rise to the inverted-U relationship between inequality and growth. This pattern seemed to fit 
both the American and the OECD experience up to the 1970s, but has failed to explain the 
increase in inequality which took place after the 1980s. Based on a broad panel of countries, 
Barro (2000) finds that higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries and 
encourage growth in richer countries, and finds in a sense support for the Kuznets curve. The 
modern line of research has however come to focus on the reverse causality, that of 
inequality on growth.  
Economic theory has put forward arguments in favour of a positive relationship between 
growth and inequality. The three main arguments, reviewed in Aghion et al (1999), are the 
following. The first argument is that if the growth rate is positively related to the proportion 
of national income that is saved, more unequal economies are bound to grow faster than 
economies with a high level of income distribution, since the marginal propensity to save of 
the rich is higher than that of the poor. The second argument is related to the issue of 
investment indivisibility. Investments often involve a large sunk cost, which presupposes that 
wealth needs to be concentrated for such investment projects to be undertaken - in the 
absence of well developed credit markets. The third argument relies on the effects of 
incentives through distribution. Besides the fact that a redistribution of wealth creates a more 
equalised distribution of income, if redistribution is financed by income taxes, this would 
also diminish the incentives to accumulate wealth. 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) offer an explanation in a political economy context, of a 
negative relationship between inequality and growth. In their model, physical and human 
capital accumulation are the determinants of growth. Agents’ incentives and ability to 
accumulate these are directly affected by regulatory and tax policies. Assuming that voters 
are allowed to vote and, directly or indirectly, choose tax rates, then the level of inequality 
would decide the extent of redistribution and thus have an effect on the growth rate. More 
unequal societies would opt for a higher level of redistribution, in turn affecting growth 
negatively due to reduced incentives. In a democratic political set-up, this inverse 
relationship between income inequality and growth would be expected to be stronger if the 
income distribution is tilted to the left, giving lower-income groups more political power.  
Aghion et al (1999) point out channels through which inequality would have a negative effect 
on an economy’s rate of growth under the assumption that wealth and human capital 
endowments are heterogeneous across individuals and capital markets are imperfect. Based   5
on microeconomic theories of incentives, basically credit market incentives and moral 
hazard, they argue that inequality reduces investment opportunities, worsens borrowers’ 
incentives and generates macro economic volatility. They underline that when capital 
markets are imperfect there is a scope for growth enhancing redistributive policies. 
Cross-country growth studies have typically found a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth.
2 Studies based on panel-data estimations have tended to find a positive 
relationship (see Forbes(2000)). Panel-data estimations differ from cross-section analysis in 
that they control for country effects that are fixed over time, and study within-country 
variations. The positive effect of inequality on growth in panel data estimation is understood 
as the relationship between inequality and growth on average being positive when looking 
within a country. The time spans studied in the literature differs, with panel data estimations 
tending to look at the effects of initial inequality on averaged 5 or 10 year growth rates, 
whereas cross country studies have generally looked at the effects on long run 40-year 
growth rates. 
Regarding the role played by redistribution in the interplay between inequality and growth, 
there is no strong evidence in the literature that inequality has led to a higher level of 
redistribution, however evidence has been pointing at a positive relationship between 
redistribution and growth.
3  
Controlling for country differences by looking at regions within a country, panel-data studies 
looking at the relation between income and inequality across US states have found varying 
results depending on the measure of inequality used.
4 
 
When studying the relation of inequality and growth in regions within a country all the above 
mechanisms could be expected to be at work given that there is variation across geographical 
areas. However, the mechanisms at work vary in terms of the dynamic horizons involved and 
underlying assumptions need not all be as important in a within county framework. For 
example, the fiscal independence across counties is more limited than across countries. 
 
                                                 
2 See Benabou (1996) for a survey on this empirical and theoretical work of cross-country studies. 
3 Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Perotti (1996) both find that redistribution, measured in terms of marginal tax 
rates, has if anything a positive effect on growth.  
4 Panniza (2002) and Partridge (1997)   6
One mechanism linking inequality to growth is the higher propensity to save among the rich, 
in combination with investment indivisibilities. In a closed economy framework this could be 
an important mechanism at work. However it is unlikely that domestic savings play a central 
role at the county-level in Sweden, other than for smaller scale investments. In any case the 
time span for this mechanism to have an effect is more of a short to medium term effect. The 
other mechanisms relate to the role played by redistribution. Redistribution is negative in the 
sense that it worsens incentives to accumulate wealth. In the long run however, and when 
capital markets are imperfect, redistribution is good to the extent that it enables the correct 
use of talents and increases human and physical capital.  
 
III.   Issues relating to the empirical design of the inequality growth 
relationship 
Countries or regions? 
A problem when looking at countries with disparate features is that the same model 
specification might not be relevant for all countries. There might be fundamental differences 
among countries in e.g. the level of democracy, human rights, type of economy, education 
system etc, which does not make it reasonable to expect that one model holds for all 
countries. Furthermore cross country studies have been plagued with problems related to data 
comparability both across countries and across time, which is a problem since in a cross 
country OLS regression countries in different phases of development are basically seen as 
one country in different periods of time.  
Limiting the scope of the study to regions within the same country, in this case Swedish 
counties (län), still using panel data, could help bring additional light on the relation between 
inequality and growth. Do we find a positive relationship between growth and inequality 
when looking at regions within a country as in the panel data cross-country studies? The 
advantage of looking at regions within a country is that one can achieve a better level of 
comparability of inequality measures, both in term of quality and in terms of the definition 
used in constructing these measures, than is the case in cross country studies. Furthermore, as 
noted in Partridge (1997), growth-reducing distributional conflicts need not only arise at the 
national level, but could potentially arise at lower levels, making a cross county study 
relevant. Moreover, counties are similar enough to expect that one model specification holds   7
for all the counties, and the political process could be expected to be equally democratic 
across regions. However, a drawback of looking at counties is that human and physical 
capital mobility among regions could limit the ability of local governments to engage in 
income redistribution making it important to control for variables such as migration across 
counties. Further, most redistributive programs and tax policies may be administered by the 
state – possibly making it difficult to capture the presence of any fiscal policy channel in the 
inequality growth relationship, unless there exists a variation between counties regarding the 
tax levels and welfare expenditure etc. 
 
A few studies have looked at regions within a country. Partridge (1997) found a positive 
relationship between Gini and growth when using a panel-data set on the US for the period 
1960-1990, but emphasises that different measures of inequality can give different results. 
Based on a similar data set for the period 1940-1990, Panizza (2002) found evidence of a 
negative relationship, underlining that the relationship is not robust to different measures of 
inequality, and to different econometric specifications. 
Short or long term effects?  
 
The relationship between GDP growth and income inequality is often estimated in the 
empirical literature by regressing average GDP growth in a 5 or 10-year period on income 
inequality and control variables such as human capital accumulation, initial GDP level (to 
capture economic convergence), and various macro economic indicators.  
 
However, this set-up has a certain number of drawbacks. First of all, using n-year averages 
for growth rates or other variables is not always recommendable. Apart from reasons of data 
availability, the main argument to use average growth rates is to capture long run variations 
and abstract from business cycles fluctuations. However, Attanasio et al. (2000) argue the 
opposite.
5 Firstly, when averaging, information provided in annual data is lost. Secondly, 
business cycle fluctuations are not necessarily eliminated by averaging over arbitrarily set 
fixed intervals, since their length vary over time and across regions. Thirdly, averaging 
“prevents the possibility of considering cross-sectional heterogeneity in the parameters”. 
Finally, focusing only on long-run effects prevents the analysis of short-run effects, where 
significant but opposing effects may be acting with different lags. Given these reasons, we 
                                                 
5 Averaging is problematic if there is autocorrelation and persistence in the series   8
choose to consider non-averaged information as well as averaged information. That is, we 
estimate 1, 3, 5 and 10-year growth regressions, still using yearly data observations. Instead 
of estimating the effect of initial conditions on the following 5 years growth rate, using 
distinct non overlapping intervals we estimate the growth regression using overlapping 
intervals, and in this way we are not as sensitive to business cycle variations in the initial 
conditions which could otherwise affect the results. This procedure also has the advantage of 
increasing the degrees of freedom. However, we have had to interpolate part of the data on 
the human capital stock which we do not have annual data on. These variables have little 
short-run variation and exhibit more of a trend over time, although the trend differs in the 
beginning and the end of the period. Interpolating them should not pose a large problem.    
The problem of simultaneity? 
 
There is a fundamental problem of endogeneity in the growth regressions that needs to be 
addressed. Apart from reasons of possible omitted variable bias that could lead to 
endogeneity bias, it is plausible to assume that income inequality is jointly determined with 
the economics growth rate. If the RHS variables are endogenous and thus correlated with the 
error term, the OLS / FE coefficient estimate is biased and inconsistent 
The fact that the RHS variables are dated at the beginning of the growth period naturally 
minimises the problem of endogeneity. But these variables are highly persistent (large inertia 
in these variables) so the problem of endogeneity may still persist.  
One such variable is the Gini coefficient. That Gini and economic growth may be jointly 
determined is not difficult to claim. On the one hand, the modern line of research which has 
come to focus on the reverse causality, that of inequality on growth, has found empirical 
evidence that growth is affected by the level of inequality. On the other hand, as mentioned 
earlier, Kuznets’ hypothesis suggests that income distribution is systematically affected by 
the level of economic development, giving rise to an inverted u-shape between inequality and 
growth. Even though Kuznets’ hypothesis relates to the transition from an agricultural to an 
industrial society, one could argue that similar forces may be at work in the transition from 
an industrial to a service economy.   
There may also be a shorter run causality relation between growth and income inequality, in 
the sense that income inequality may vary as a result of economic recessions and expansions.    9
 
IV.  Data 
Until 1997 Sweden was divided into 24 counties (including Gotland’s municipality which is 
its own county) and a total of 289 municipalities (see map in Appendix ). Two mergers have 
since taken place.
6 In this study we stick to the pre-1998 division of counties and maintain a 
panel of 24 counties. Data on income and income inequality are available for the years 1951 
and onwards. However due to data availability of other variables this study focuses on the 
period 1960-2000. 
The data on income inequality as well as the underlying income data is based on taxable 
individual income based on the population aged 20 and over. There is a risk that the 
inequality measure based on individual income may overstate the actual level of inequality, 
since it does not take into account the reallocation taking place within a household. Data on 
income inequality is measured in terms on Gini index. Gini is a measure of inequality, the 
larger the index, the larger the level of inequality. The fiscal legislation as well as the 
definition of the income that is presented in the tax register has changed a few times and 
various adjustments have been made to account for this in the data.
7 Other county-level data 
is a measure of human capital stock (college) referring to the share of the population aged 25-
59 having a college education. The share of the population living in the county’s largest city 
(urban) is used as a proxy for urbanisation.
8 In order to control for the age structure we 
divide the adult population aged 20 years and above into four age groups, keeping the age 
group 20-39 as our reference group.
9 See Appendix A for further information on the 
inequality variable and Appendix B for the definition and source of the remaining variables 
used in this study. 
                                                 
6 In 1997 Kristianstad and Malmöhus counties formed Skåne county, and in 1998 Älvsborg’s, Skaraborg’s as well 
as Göteborg’s and Bohus’ county merged into Västra Götaland’s county. 
7The Gini coefficient has been adjusted for various breaks in the trend. The main trend breaks are 1973/1974 and 
1990/1991. The first is due to various social insurances becoming taxable and the second is due to the 1991 tax 
reform.  
 
8 According to the rank-size rule this measure may also capture the overall urban structure in the area. Zipf (1949) 
first devised the theory of rank-size rule to explain the size of cities in a country. He explained that the second and 
subsequently smaller cities should represent a proportion of the largest city. Zipf stated that the second largest city 
in a country would contain 1/2 as many as the first. The third would contain 1/3 and so on, with the rank of the 
city representing the denominator in the fraction.  
9 We limit the analysis to the composition of the adult population over 20 years of age since our inequality 
measure is based on this group. Since this age structure data is observed the 31
st of December each year, we have 
lagged the data one period.   10
 
Our income variable refers to gross per capita taxable income of the population aged 20 
years, and is contingent on the definition of taxable income, which after 1974 has come to 
include various transfer payments. Given this, our county level income measure is to be 
interpreted as total per capita taxable income, and only a proxy for GDP rather than a direct 
measure of it. However, comparing the data with national GDP, the level and annual rate of 
change of the sum of the counties’ income in real terms is highly correlated with that of real 
national GDP for the period studied. The correlation in levels is 0.99 over the whole period, 
and the correlation in 1 to 10-year annual growth rate ranges between 0.64 and 0.85.  
 
Table 1: Correlation between national GDP and the sum of the counties’ income, in level and 
growth rates, 1960-2000 
Annual growth rates 
1-year   0.6410 
3-year   0.7473 
5-year   0.7494 
10-year   0.8584 
 
Level 
level  0.9937 
   11
Figure 2: Income growth rates in the Swedish counties 
from 1960-2000 

























































Notes: The income growth data is based on taxable individual income from the population aged 
20 and over. Each line in the figure refers to a county. Source: Original data from 
Statistics Sweden. See Appendix A for further information. 
 
Regarding the income growth rates across counties, as shown in figure 2, there is less 
variation across counties in the period post mid-70s, when various transfers became taxable 
and got included in the data. A closer look at the data also shows that urban counties had 
among the lowest growth rates up to the mid 70s, and the same counties (except Malmö) 
including the adjoining counties had the highest growth rates after mid-70s. The variation 
across time decreases the longer the growth period considered. It is also to be noted that the 
10 year growth rates have a very similar trend to that of the Gini coefficient. 
The evolution of income inequality in Sweden can be divided into four phases. (See figure 
1). The level of income inequality within counties remained high during the 1960s, despite a   12
gradual decrease, and with a high variation across counties. During the 1970’s the level of 
inequality diminished drastically, as well as the variation across counties. In the 1980’s the 
level was held relatively constant, and with a small variation across counties. It is to be noted 
that most studies dealing with income inequality in Sweden, or cross country comparisons of 
income inequality including Sweden, have focused on the 1980s and part of the 1990s, a 
period of low and stable inequality compared to the large variations income inequality has 
shown over the past five decades. 
Looking closer at the cross-county dimension, the largest drop in inequality between the 
years 1960 to 2000 is found in the northern counties, (29% decrease) whereas urban counties 
- counties with the largest cities - have the lowest drop in inequality (14% decrease).
10 The 
urban counties have gone from having the lowest levels in inequality in 1960, relative to the 
other counties, to having the highest level of inequality in the year 2000, whereas the 
northern counties have changed their position from high to low inequality relative to other 
counties.  
The drop in income inequality over time can be explained partly by the increased female 
labour supply and by the expansion of social security and the pension system. The 
differences across counties may depend on factors such as differences in age structure, in 
education levels, in the initial industry set-up leading to more or less favourable 
infrastructure. These differences could give rise to differences with respect to the volume and 
variation of transfer payments across counties over time. Similarly, counties may also differ 
with respect to how they adjust to tax reforms.  
 
V. Empirical framework  
This paper estimates a model similar to that used in most empirical work on inequality and 
growth. Income growth is estimated as a function of a set of initial conditions including 
inequality, income, human capital and a set of other controls. The basic model to be 
estimated is the following: 
, , , , ,
, ,
t i i t t i t i t i
t i n t i u Z X y
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y y
ε α θ γ β + + + + ∆ + =
− +          (1) 
                                                 
10 The northern counties – so called Norrlandslän - refer to Norrbotten, Västerbotten, Västernorrland and 
Gävleborg, and are characterized by lower population density compared to the rest of the country. The counties of 
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö are referred to as urban cities.    13
 
where  t i y ,  is the log income per capita in county i at date t, and n is the length of the time 
period chosen for measuring growth. The left hand side in equation (1) is thus the growth rate 
of income.  i ∆  is a variable denoting a measure of county i´s income distribution, i X is a 
matrix of controls which are time variant and county-specific, whereas Z is a matrix of time 
controls which do not vary over counties,  i u is the county fixed effects and  t i, ε  is the error 
term. The initial level of per capita income in the beginning of each period is used to control 
for economic convergence across counties. In line with the convergence literature, the 
implicit assumption is that growth is converging to an equilibrium growth path that is a 
function of the initial conditions.
11 The first control variable is the stock of human capital 
measured in terms of the percentage of the adult population at various education levels. In 
line with Perotti's (1996) specification, also used in Panizza (2000) in a cross state study we 
control for the degree of urbanisation and the age structure, measured in terms of the portion 
of the adult population above the age of 65. We use the share of the population living in the 
largest city as a proxy for urbanisation. Our growth equation is estimated using 
predetermined variables as independent variables, so a direct reverse causality problem 
between inequality and growth should not arise. The problem of endogeneity which is often 
encountered in the cross country growth literature due to lack of data is thus alleviated here. 
(see Persson and Tabellini 1994,  Alesina and Rodrik 1994). However, given that inequality 
is an inertial variable, inequality and growth can still be considered to be jointly determined.  
Ignoring the endogeneity of the right-hand side variables when running the growth 
regression, as is commonly done in the literature, leads to a bias in the coefficient estimates 
of these right-hand side variables. In the later part of the paper, we estimate the growth 
regression using 2SLS instrument variable estimation on panel data with fixed effects.
12 We 
choose to estimate a single equation rather than a simultaneous equation system. For the 
2SLS to be consistent it is enough that the first equation is correctly specified and that the 
instruments are exogenous. For an equation system to be consistent and asymptotically more 
efficient than single equation estimation all equations in the system need to be correctly 
                                                 
11 Persson (1997) has shown that convergence is a fact across Swedish counties. 
12 It is to be noted that the fixed effects estimator deals with endogeneity problems that can be traced to 
unobservable time-invariant county-fixed effects. The regression is estimated using the 2SLS IV for panel data 
with STATA´s xtivreg command   14
specified. If this is not fulfilled, none of the estimated parameters are consistent. Hence we 
prefer the single equation procedure since it is more robust to specification errors.  
A note on the direction of causality between Gini and income-growth is appropriate in a time 
series framework before heading on to the estimation results. To check the direction of 
causality we perform a simple Granger causality test, a means of statistically determining 
whether the direction of causality can be detected.
13 The Granger causality test does not give 
us much guidance in the direction of causality between income inequality and growth. We 
can not reject the null hypothesis, at any reasonable significance level, that the average 
growth rates of year (t-n, t) does not Granger cause Gini at time t. We can neither, in the 
majority of cases,  reject the null that initial Gini at time t does not Granger cause the average 
annual growth rates of the following years (t, t+n).
14 In the case of 1 and 2-year growth rates, 
the null can however be rejected at the 10 % level, when using 2-3 lags. When looking at the 
Granger causality between income inequality and income level, the test indicates that the 
causality goes from Gini to income, but not the opposite. 
 
VI.  Results 
 
The growth equations are based on n-year growth periods. The coefficients in the growth 
equation should be interpreted as the effect of initial conditions (inequality, human capital…) 
on the average growth rate the following n years. We present 1, 3, 5 and 10- year growth 
period results.   
We start out by presenting the single equation estimation results of equation (1) so as to have 
a benchmark comparison with earlier literature on the relationship between inequality and 
growth, disregarding any endogeneity bias that may exist. For reasons of comparison with 
the literature we also present the estimations with distinct windows, that is where the 
intermediate years are not included in the set of observations. We then proceed to the 2SLS 
IV estimation results where income inequality is considered endogenous.  
 
                                                 
13 The test assumes that the information relevant to the prediction of the respective variables is contained only in 
the time series data of these variables. 
14 The Granger causality test is performed using STATA’s gcause command with 1-3 lags. These results are based 
on Stockholm county, but the results are similar across counties.   15
VI.1 The growth regression – standard fixed effects estimation –  
all RHS variables exogenous 
 
Fixed effects regressions are estimated on both distinct and on overlapping windows. We 
start by restricting time effects to zero, i.e. do not include any time dummies. The results are 
presented in Tables 2a and 2b. Random-effects specifications are presented in Appendix C  
 
Table 2a: Fixed effects growth regressions without time dummies 
Estimated without the intermediate year observations - distinct window 
 Growth  periods 
variable  1year 3years  5  years 10  years 
      
y   -0.058** -0.085** -0.112** -0.029** 
  (5.33) (7.48) (8.58) (8.72) 
Gini  0.329** 0.259** 0.177** 0.143** 
 (11.62)  (8.33)  (4.58)  (12.54) 
college  0.275** 0.331** 0.383** 0.110** 
  (9.20) (10.14)  (9.17) (8.51) 
urban  0.116** 0.146** 0.179** 0.010 
  (3.22) (3.86) (3.77) (0.88) 
age_65+ 0.331**  0.263*  0.176  0.101** 
  (3.36) (2.48) (1.32) (3.00) 
constant  0.419** 0.768** 1.124** 0.262** 
  (3.64) (6.34) (8.30) (7.13) 
 
Observations  960 336 192 96 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.25 0.46 0.54 0.96 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10 years growth periods. R-squared 
refers to the within-R-squared for fixed effects. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at the 5% and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. Regarding the independent variables, y is the 
log of income per capita, Gini is the Gini coefficient, college is the percentage of the population aged 25-59 
with a college education, urban is the share of the population living in the county’s largest town, age_65+ is the 
share the adult population aged 65 and over. 
   16
Table 2b: Fixed effects growth regressions without time dummies 
- overlapping window 
 Growth  periods 
variable  1year 3years  5  years 10  years 
      
y   -0.058** -0.099** -0.102** -0.045** 
 (5.33)  (13.45)  (18.34)  (17.81) 
Gini  0.329** 0.258** 0.135** 0.019** 
 (11.62)  (13.37)  (8.93)  (2.61) 
college  0.275** 0.338** 0.307** 0.089** 
 (9.20)  (16.25)  (17.24)  (7.33) 
urban  0.116** 0.154** 0.140** 0.015 
  (3.22) (6.39) (7.56) (1.68) 
age_65+  0.331** 0.364** 0.165** -0.064* 
  (3.36) (5.39) (3.14) (2.58) 
constant  0.419** 0.906** 1.044** 0.541** 
 (3.64)  (11.61)  (17.86)  (20.99) 
 
Observations  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.25 0.45 0.55 0.80 
      
Notes: See Table 2a 
 
Applying the Hausman (1978) test we can reject the null that the difference in coefficients is 
not systematic, in favour of the fixed effects, irrespective of growth period studied and 
irrespective of whether time dummies are included. The coefficient estimates are however 
similar in terms of sign and significance level in the random and fixed-effects estimations, 
although the coefficient of the Gini variable in the random-effects estimation is lower in 
magnitude.   
 
Since we clearly do not have stationary series it is important to test for cointegration of the 
series. If the error term in our fixed-effects estimation is stationary, the right hand side 
variables are said to be cointegrated. Estimating the panel unit root test developed by Levin, 
Lin and Chu (2002), we can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the error term 
using 1-2 lags. This test assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same AR(1) 
coefficient. Testing for the number of cointegrating vectors in the system by using Johansen's 
maximum likelihood cointegration rank test and checking if it varies across panels we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that we have a cointegrating vector of rank r = 2, and the same rank 
holds across panels. Using  a likelihood-ratio test  we can  reject the null hypothesis that one 
or more of the variables in the VAR do not enter in the cointegrating relationship.
15  
 
                                                 
15 We use the lrjtest command in STATA. As noted in Phillips and Moon (1999, 2000), however, spurious 
regressions need not be as big an issue in panel data framework.    17
The fixed effects estimations may be inconsistent due to the presence of the lagged income 
term on the right-hand side. Monte Carlo simulations in Judson and Owen (1996) have 
shown that, for panels with a short time dimension, the bias of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable can be significant, but that the bias for the coefficient on the other right-
hand side variables tends to be minor. Running a GMM estimation suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) that corrects for this bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable we 
do not find evidence of any significant bias neither in the Gini coefficient or in the lagged 
income coefficient in the 1-year growth regression with no time dummies. 
   
Restricting the time effects to zero, irrespective of whether we look at distinct windows or 
overlapping windows, Tables 1a and 1b show that, as predicted by models implying 
conditional convergence, the estimates show a significant and negative coefficient on initial 
income. The share of the population with a college education has a significant positive effect 
on income growth.
16 The share of the population aged 65+ has, a positive effect on short run 
growth, and a negative effect on longer term growth in the overlapping window case.
17 
Urbanisation has a positive effect on income growth, and the effects are significant in the 
short and medium run. This result is in line with Agglomeration Theory which states that a 
large concentration of individuals leads to a higher degree of specialization and enables 
economies of scale thus paving the way for economic growth. 
 
Income inequality in terms of Gini has a significant positive effect in all growth periods 
studied and decreases over the length of the growth period studied irrespective of whether we 
look at distinct or overlapping windows. In the 10-year growth periods the difference in the 
coefficients between the estimations using overlapping and distinct windows is large. We 
give more weight to the estimations using overlapping windows since they include more 
observations and are less sensitive to business cycle variations. However there is a risk that 
overlapping windows exhibit a large degree of autocorrelation in the residuals. To deal with 
this issue we apply Newey West corrected standard error, in an OLS with county dummies, 
allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals. We choose a lag corresponding to the length of 
the growth period studied. That is, e.g. in the specification using annual 10-year growth rates 
                                                 
16 We choose to omit the share of secondary educated since the two variables are highly correlated especially 
during the first 15 years of our study. 
17 The positive effect of age_65+ on growth is not expected. This is a group with negative savings, which demands 
low productivity services in the public sector. An increase in this variable also corresponds to an outflow from the 
labour force.    18
we correct for autocorrelation up to the 10
th lag. The coefficient of the Gini variable in the 
10-year growth rates specification turns insignificant at the 5% level. The results are 
presented in Appendix D.  
 
How do we relate our findings to earlier studies? The positive effects of inequality on growth 
confirm Barro’s (2000) findings that the positive relationship between income inequality and 
growth is a high income country feature. The results further confirm Forbes’ (2000) findings, 
that when looking within a country, and controlling for all the country specific and time 
invariant features, we find a positive relationship, at least in the short and medium run.
18 The 
fact that the effect decreases in the 1- to 10-year growth period and is insignificant in the 10 
year Newey West specification indicates that the positive relationship is basically a short to 
medium term one.
19 The fact that the Gini coefficient is insignificant in the 10-year growth 
specification could depend on the relationship not being stable over time, since explanatory 
variables post-1990 are not included in the 10-year specifications. However, when estimating 
the 1-10 year growth regression on the pre-1990 period, we still get a coefficient estimate on 
the Gini coefficient of the same magnitude.  
 
The economic impact of income inequality on growth is significantly lower in our study 
compared to both cross state studies in the US, and cross country studies. Our estimations 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.32 
percent increase in the growth rate over the following year, a 0.13 percent increase in the 
average annual growth rate over the following five years and a 0.02 percent increase in the 
growth rate over the following 10 years. Forbes (2000) found that a one standard deviation 
increase in the Gini coefficient is correlated with a 1.3 percent increase in average annual 
growth over the next five years. In a study of US states Panizza (2002) found a one standard 
deviation increase in the Gini coefficient to cause a 0.2 percentage decrease on growth rates 
during the following decade.  
 
The fact that our results are much smaller in magnitude than those found in cross country 
studies is not surprising, since higher labour and capital mobility in combination with the role 
played by the central government are important reasons for income distribution to have a 
                                                 
18 The positive effects found in Forbes (2000) on cross country panel data are also based on 5 year growth effects.   
19 However even if the magnitude of the long run effects are much smaller it does not imply that the effects are 
negligible since there is an accumulation effect to be considered as well. An annual effect of 0.019% over 10 years 
has an accumulated effect of  0.21%.   19
smaller impact on growth. The magnitude of our inequality coefficient is also much smaller 
than that found in the US cross state studies. But one could argue that the US states are 
population and economy-wise much larger than that of Swedish counties and that the income 
inequality dynamics studied here may be more comparable to that of regions within a US 
state.  
 
For reasons of policy implications it is of interest to compare the effects of inequality on 
growth to that of other control variables. The magnitude of the effect of college education on 
growth is comparable to that of inequality in the 1- to 3-year growth periods. In the longer 
run, college education has a stronger effect on the growth rate than inequality and remains 
significant even in the 10 year growth specification.  
 
The exclusion of time dummies puts a restriction on the steady state assumption in the model 
tested by assuming a time-invariant Steady State, and thus no long run growth, and is also 
likely to create an omitted variable bias. Including time dummies does to an extent control 
for technological change/overall trend but it also exacerbates the problem of multicollinearity 
in a fixed effects estimation. If the variation over time of variables is similar across counties 
(e.g. with variables with a big trend component), there is a risk that the year dummies capture 
too much of the variation of certain variables. 
20 
 
The results of the specification including year dummies are presented in Table 3a and 3b for 
the overlapping and non-overlapping cases respectively.
 21 Although the significance level of 
College decreases, as expected, the fact that it turns negative need not be surprising. College 
is an attempt to measure human capital accumulation, however given the increase in 
education level among younger cohorts compared to older cohorts, an increase in College 
could as well mean a larger share of youngsters with less experience, and thus a lower level 
of human capital accumulation.  The estimates of the Gini coefficient remain positive, 
although lower in magnitude, compared to the specification without time dummies. In the 10-
year growth specification the coefficient of the Gini index remains positive and significant 
                                                 
20 Alternative ways of dealing with trends in the variables is to divide income with the average income across 
counties, or just include a time trend. In the first case, we only capture the trend problems in the initial income 
variable, whereas the second alternative results in problems of multicollinearity  
 
21 Alternative specifications have also been estimated using decade dummies, 5 year-dummies and regime 
dummies to account for the three main exchange rate regimes of the period. The magnitude in the variables of 
interest are however similar in magnitude irrespective of the choice of time dummy variables. 
   20
even with Newey West adjusted standard errors, as can be seen in Appendix D, Table D2. 
The magnitude of the effect of income inequality on growth is not as clearly diminishing 
with the length of the growth period studied, however the effects of the 10-year specification 
are still much lower than the shorter run specifications.  
 
Table 3a: Fixed effects growth regressions with year dummies 
Estimated without the intermediate year observations - distinct window 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
        
y  
-
0.060** -0.058** -0.055** -0.043** 
 (3.97)  (4.56)  (4.09)  (3.35) 
gini 0.270**  0.279**  0.294**  0.185** 
 (7.55)  (8.73)  (8.42)  (3.92) 
college -0.037  -0.043  -0.012  0.060* 
 (1.32)  (1.78)  (0.46)  (2.31) 
urban 0.069**  0.069**  0.061**  0.021 
 (4.25)  (5.22)  (4.40)  (1.68) 
age_65+ 0.076  0.079*  0.074  0.035 
 (1.66)  (2.11)  (1.83)  (0.88) 
constant 0.546**  0.510**  0.476**  0.411* 
 (3.08)  (3.41)  (2.95)  (2.55) 
 
Observations 960  336  192  96 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
R-squared 0.90 0.96  0.97  0.96 
        
(R-squared) (0.13) (0.37)  (0.55)  (0.61) 
 
Notes: See Table 2a. (R-squared) is the R-squared of an OLS regression on within and cross-county transformed 
data, and thus captures the R2 which does not accrue to time dummies. 
 
Table 3b: Fixed effects growth regressions with year dummies 
- overlapping window 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
      
y   -0.060** -0.069** -0.070** -0.067** 
 (3.97)  (8.82)  (12.89)  (22.71) 
gini  0.270** 0.247** 0.206** 0.072** 
 (7.55)  (12.76)  (14.40)  (8.01) 
college -0.037  -0.050**  -0.037**  0.001 
  (1.32) (3.36) (3.45) (0.10) 
urban  0.069** 0.067** 0.058** 0.023** 
 (4.25)  (8.07)  (10.05)  (7.29) 
age_65+ 0.076  0.079**  0.058**  0.026** 
  (1.66) (3.37) (3.53) (2.81) 
constant  0.546** 0.650** 0.696** 0.737** 
 (3.08)  (7.04)  (10.71)  (20.62) 
Observations  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.90 0.96 0.97 0.98 
      
(R-squared)  (0.13) (0.36) (0.50) (0.68)   21
Notes: See Table 2a. (R-squared) is the R-squared of an OLS regression on within and cross-county transformed 
data, and thus captures the R2 which does not accrue to time dummies. 
 
 
VI.1.2  Sensitivity analysis 
 
These results are robust to the exclusion of a year, or a county at a time, and are thus not 
driven by any outliers.  
 
The relationship between income inequality and growth remains positive and significant 
when looking at various subsets of periods, when controlling for year dummies. We study the 
period before and after 1980 separately. It gives us not only a comparable time span in each 
sub-period, but catches different trends in inequality. Inequality showed a steady decrease up 
until 1980, followed by an increase in inequality in the 1990s. The results remain stable 
across time periods. Given that the definition of taxable income has changed in 1974 and 
1991 we estimate the relationship before and after these dates, and find the sign, significance 
and magnitude of the Gini-coefficient to be relatively stable across time periods. This assures 
that our results are not very sensitive to whether our estimations are based on pre or post 
transfer income. We study the period before and after 1974 separately, and include year 
dummies to control for period specific effects. Both time periods show a significant and 
positive effect of inequality on growth. The only exception is the 10-year growth rates 
specification post-1974 which turns insignificant, although it is to be noted that we are 
dealing with a small sample. The magnitude of the effect of inequality on the 1 to 5 year 
growth rate in the post 1974 era is somewhat lower that in the pre 1974 era, although not 
significantly lower. 
 
To check whether our results hold for other measures of income inequality we use both the 
share of the third quintile (Q3) an the Theil’s Entropy Index (theil) as alternative measures of 
income inequality. The share of the third quintile is often used as a measure of the median 
voter in political economy contexts and is closely related to the Gini index to the extent that 
observations around the median affect the Gini measure more than observations around the 
tails. Theil’s entropy index is more sensitive to observations in the upper tail of income 
distribution. We do not consider measures which are more sensitive to the bottom of the 
income distribution, since there have been changes over time in the lower limit at which 
income is subject to taxation has varied over time, and using a measure sensitive to this part 
of the income distribution may lead to biased results.    22
 
The coefficients from the fixed effects estimations where Theil’s index and the share of the 
third quintile are used as inequality measures are presented in Table 4, together with the 
coefficients of the estimations with the Gini index.
22  The results of the Theil’s entropy index 
and the share of the third quintile are in line with that of the Gini index. We find a similar 
decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient, the longer the growth period. The coefficients of 
the third quintile are negative, in line with the earlier results that more equality leads to less 
growth, but turn insignificant at the 5% level in longer run growth periods.  
 
Table 4: Fixed effects growth regressions with year dummies 
- overlapping window 
Growth periods 
1year 3years  5  years 10  years 
Gini 
0.270**  0.247** 0.206** 0.072** 
(7.55)  (12.76) (14.40) (8.01) 
Theil 
0.158**  0.140** 0.115** 0.039** 




0.152**  -0.055 -0.002 
(2.20)  (3.48) (1.78) (0.15) 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10 years growth periods. Absolute 
value of t statistics in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% and ** denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
VI.2.  Income inequality as an endogenous variable 
 
VI.2. 1.  Choice of instruments 
 
In this section we consider inequality as endogenous for reasons mentioned above. The 
instrument variables have two basic requirements to fulfil: they should be correlated with the 
endogenous variable(s) they are to explain, and they should be orthogonal to the error 
process. We test these criteria by examining the fit of the first stage regressions and by 
applying Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions, which gives an indication of the 
validity of the set of instruments.  
We use the age structure of the population aged over 20 as instrument variables. It is to be 
noted that we here, to a larger extent, capture the inequality between rather than within age 
                                                 
22 The complete estimations, both with and without year dummies are presented in Appendix E. 
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groups. The age structure is an exogenous variable, or at least a predetermined variable in 
this context. It has a direct effect on income distribution since it captures the shares of the 
population in various parts of their life cycle. Pensioners and young adults are likely to 
decrease inequality, mature adults and middle-aged would have the opposite effect by 
increasing inequality. The structure of the entire adult population is a more exogenous 
measure than age structure in the labour force, to the extent that contemporary earnings 
profiles for different education levels would affect the education choice of the young, thus 
affecting their entrance in the labour market. Even though there may be direct effects of the 
age structure on growth, as has been shown in the literature, it ought to be other mechanisms 
which give an effect on the Gini coefficient.
23  
 
VI.2. 2.  First stage regressions  
 









y   -0.002 -0.069**  -0.167** 
 (0.13)  (7.17)  (12.76) 
College -0.131**  0.140**  0.182** 
 (3.00)  (3.93)  (6.53) 
urban 0.014  -0.040  -0.076** 
 (0.34)  (1.41)  (5.15) 
age_20_34 -0.384**  -0.161*  -0.176** 
 (5.62)  (2.58)  (3.42) 
age_50_64 0.368**  0.120  -0.290** 
 (4.87)  (1.87)  (5.11) 
age_65+ -1.924**  -0.904**  -0.227** 
 (21.08)  (11.99)  (4.94) 
Constant 0.913**  1.493**  2.563** 
 (7.23)  (14.66)  (15.61) 
Observations 960  960  960 
Nbr of 
counties 24  24 
R-squared 0.88  0.94 
24 
0.99 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. R-squared refers to the within-R-squared for fixed effects. 
Absolute value of t statistics are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1% level respectively. 
For the independent variables, y is the log of income per capita, age_20_34, age_50_64 and age_65+ are the 
share of the respective age groups in the adult population, urban is the share of the population living in the 
largest city, college is the percentage of the population aged 25-59 with a college education. 
 
 
                                                 
23 In line with previous studies, Perotti (1996), Forbes (2000) and Panizza ( 2002)  we do however include the 
share of the adult population aged 65 and over in the growth specification. Adding the remaining age structure 
variables to the growth equation does not add to the explanatory power of the estimation. The fact that the age 
structure refers to that of the adult population and not to that of the labour force further weakens the link between 
growth and age structure.   24
The first stage regression results are presented in Table 5a with Gini as a dependent variable. 
We choose to present the results of the first stage regression from the 1-year growth 
specification, since it includes all observations.  
 
The validity of the IV estimator requires that the instruments describe the variation in the 
instrumented variable. One measure of the degree of correlation suggested by Staiger and 
Stock (1997) is the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regression, in this 
case age_20_34 and age_50_64. A large F-statistic implies that the instruments offer a good 
explanation of the variation in the endogenous variables. Our F-statistics are in excess of 10 
even in the specifications including time dummies. 
 
Applying Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term) when we do 
not include time dummies. When controlling for year dummies only the 1-year growth 
regression has valid instruments. When including decade dummies 5 and 10-year growth 
regressions have valid instruments.  
 
Compared to our reference 35-49 age group, pensioners, age_65+, have an equalising effect 
on income distribution, as well as the 20-34 age group. The share of mature adults “situated 
in the top” of their age-income profile (age_50_64) contribute to an increase in inequality, 
although this result is not robust to the inclusion of time dummies. Human capital stock 
measured as the share of the population aged 25-65 having a college education (college), has 
a negative effect on inequality, as long as time dummies are not included.
 24  Urbanisation 
has a significant equalising effect on income distribution, when controlling for year 
dummies, but is otherwise positive and insignificant. 
 
                                                 
24 When including secondary education in the specification, the coefficient has a negative but insignificant effect 
on inequality, and omitting this variable does not have an effect on the coefficients of the remaining variables. A 
higher overall level of human capital would be expected to have an equalising effect on income inequality. The 
reverse causality, that of income inequality on education levels, would not be a big issue in Sweden. Income 
inequality would be expected to have a relatively weak effect on human capital accumulation in Sweden. Both 
secondary and college education is entirely subsidised by the state, and the presence of study allowances and 
grants does not make the individual’s private financial background any important obstacle in the choice to pursue 
an education. Other issues like the presence of a university in ones county could have effects on the choice of post 
secondary education. But this county-specific variable should however be captured in the fixed-effects term of the 
specification, given that the college has been there the whole period.   25
VI.2. 3.  2SLS IV  regressions 
 
 
In the case with no time dummies (Table 6a) the coefficient of the Gini index remains 
positive and significant in the 1-year growth period, and turns negative and significant in the 
10-year growth case.
25 The results are however not as stable across growth periods and are 
more sensitive to the inclusion of time dummies compared to the case when Gini was 
considered to be exogenous. When year or decade dummies are included, the positive effect 
of the Gini index on growth persists, although the coefficients are not always significant. 
However, one should be cautious in interpreting the results when time dummies are included, 
since the instrument variables are not always valid according to the Sargan’s test.  
 
The fact that the results are not robust to the inclusion of time dummies could suggest that we 
have an omitted variable problem in the case without time dummies. We may have spatial 
correlation in the residuals. Inter-county migration and intergovernmental grants are a few 
reasons to believe that spatial correlation may be an issue. Unfortunately we do not have any 
adequate data on these variables for the time period studied here. In an attempt to deal with 
this we include the total county population, which in a fixed effects setting can be interpreted 
as a proxy for migration, under the strong assumption that fertility and mortality rates are 
homogenous across the country. The results are not presented here, but the coefficient of the 
Gini index remains highly similar to the results in Table 6, both in terms of magnitude, 
significance level, and the outcome of the Sargan’s test.
26 The results do however suggest 





                                                 
25 The same estimations with Newey West adjusted standard errors are presented in Appendix F 
 
26 Sargan’s test remains rarely satisfied when time dummies are included 
27 Intergovernmental grants play an equalising role in the income redistribution process. When including 
aggregate total public expenditure as an instrument variable the coefficient of the Gini index remains positive 
across growth regressions, although insignificant in the 10-year growth regression without time dummies.  
   26
Table 6a : 2SLS IV  growth regression without time dummies –   
















Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10-years growth periods. Absolute 
value of z statistics in parentheses . * denotes significance at 5% level and  ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
Gini is endogenous, the set of instruments used are: y, college, urban, age_65+, age_20_34 and age_50_64.   
 





















Notes:  See Table 6a 
 
 Growth  periods 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.054** -0.099** -0.144* -0.021 
 (4.46)  (12.29)  (2.12)  (1.91) 
Gini 0.722**  0.251  -2.887  -0.401* 
  (5.98) (1.81) (0.72)  (2.56) 
college  0.346** 0.336** -0.973 -0.290* 
  (8.86) (7.82) (0.57)  (2.01) 
urban  0.104** 0.154** 0.118  -0.037 
  (2.61) (6.31) (0.89)  (1.28) 
age_65+ 1.109**  0.353  -4.308  -0.554** 
  (4.35) (1.45) (0.72)  (2.89) 
constant 0.019  0.914**  4.008  0.608** 
  (0.11) (5.29) (1.01)  (9.03) 
 
Obs  960 912 864  744 




  P-value  0.12 0.98 0.80  0.54 
 Growth  periods 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   0.033 -0.147* -0.098**  -0.028** 
  (0.87) (2.52)  (8.25) (8.12) 
Gini  1.826** 0.027  0.475** 0.038 
  (3.97) (0.04)  (4.10) (1.01) 
college  0.380** 0.425**  0.245** 0.039** 
  (4.20) (11.11)  (9.44) (2.59) 
urban  0.220** 0.185**  0.168** 0.004 
  (3.83) (5.90)  (9.18) (0.47) 
age_65+ 1.527**  0.032  0.192*  -0.033 
  (3.59) (0.08)  (2.51) (1.16) 
constant -1.657*  1.619  0.798**  0.332** 
  (2.32) (1.51)  (3.99) (5.80) 
Obs  960 912  864 744 




P-value 4.3e-13  8.0e-13  0.81  0.43   27
















Notes:  See Table 6a   
 
 
VII.  Concluding discussion 
 
This paper explores the relationship between inequality and growth using panel data on 
Swedish counties during the years 1960-2000.   
Using fixed–effects estimations we find evidence of a positive impact of initial income 
inequality on annual income growth the following 1 to 10-years growth period, suggesting 
that inequality has a positive impact on income growth.  
We also find that the magnitude of the effect decreases with the length of the growth period 
studied. The results indicate that the mechanisms at work in this within county framework 
relationship between initial income inequality and growth are mainly short run mechanisms. 
This could suggest the capital freed from an increase in income inequality, through a larger 
concentration of income in the upper tail of income distribution, does not translate into long 
run investments but rather in shorter run effects such as increased consumption of goods and 
services.  
The magnitude of the effect - the economic impact - is smaller compared to that found in 
both cross country studies (Forbes 2000) and US cross state studies (Panizza 2002) using 
similar estimation techniques.  
 Growth  periods 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.081* -0.088**  -0.079**  -0.049** 
 (2.17)  (5.21)  (7.02)  (5.05) 
Gini 0.138  0.137  0.155**  0.181** 
 (0.65)  (1.56)  (2.61)  (3.09) 
college -0.017  -0.040*  -0.036**  0.021 
 (0.39)  (2.37)  (3.31)  (1.59) 
urban 0.058*  0.059**  0.054**  0.030** 
 (2.42)  (5.77)  (7.83)  (5.69) 
age_65+ 0.051  0.064*  0.053**  0.031** 
 (0.85)  (2.40)  (3.02)  (2.93) 
constant 0.861  0.925**  0.865**  0.480** 
 (1.61)  (3.95)  (5.50)  (3.40) 
Obs 960  912  864  744 




on test  P-
value 0.36  0.032  0.0029  5.3e-04   28
Assuming that income inequality is endogenous, we estimate the growth regression using 
2SLS IV, where the Gini coefficient is instrumented using the age structure of the adult 
population as exogenous instrument variables. In the short run the effect of inequality on 
growth remain positive, whereas the effect in the long run is not as clear cut and depend on 
whether time dummies are included or not.   
 
The analysis could as well be extended to include College,  Urban and of course initial 
income as endogenous variables as well, since they are likely to be affected by 
contemporaneous growth as well as expectation of future growth rates.
28 It is however 
difficult to find a set of instrument variables that are available, appropriate and satisfy the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
 
In this study, the short and long run growth effects are estimated using the same set of 
explanatory variables. Further research should look closer into which forces are at work, and 
how the dynamic mechanisms at work vary at the short and long time horizons.  
                                                 
28 Regarding urbanisation, both fertility rates and in-migration may tend to increase if there is an increase in 
economic activity in a county. Concerning human capital, there may be a double causality between human capital 
and economic growth. There is a risk that an individual’s choice of whether or not to pursue an education may be 
affected by the current economic situation. In expansive economic times, young cohorts may be more inclined to 
work and postpone further education.   29
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 Appendix A
29: 
The data on income inequality is based on taxable individual income. The measure is thus 
contingent on the definition of taxable income for every year. The data on pre-tax individual 
income is retrieved from the total sum of income statistics (totalräknad inkomststatistik) 
published yearly by Statistics Sweden, and has been revised in order to account for a few 
drawbacks in the data. Our data is restricted to individuals 20 years of age and older in order 
to get a homogeneous sample where the same age groups are represented across time, 
irrespective of fiscal rules and method of data collection. The inequality data is thus based on 
individual data and not on household adjusted data on which most international data on 
inequality rely.  
Between 1960 and 1970, as well as in 1990 the income definition refers to total net income. 
For the period 1971-1990 it refers to total income and from 1991-1999 to the sum of labour 
and capital income.
30 The fiscal legislation as well as the definition of the income that is 
presented in the tax register has changed a few times. The lower limit at which capital 
income is liable to taxation has varied, having implications for who is included in the income 
statistics.  
 
In 1971 joint taxation of married couples was abolished (in favour of individual taxation), as 
well as differentiated tax scales for married and unmarried. In 1974, certain social insurances 
such as sickness benefit and unemployment benefits became taxable, and were thereby 
included in the tax register. At the same time, the level of compensation for these insurances 
was increased. The tax reform of 1990-1991 implied a decrease of the tax rate and a 
widening of the tax base. The lower limit at which capital income is subject to taxation was 
lowered and various fringe benefits became taxable. The abolishment of joint taxation in 
Sweden has not given rise to a break in the trend in the income inequality variable since the 
income measure is based on individual gross-income, even though the abolishment of joint 
                                                 
29 See Johansson (2004) for more information on the compilation of the data and a summary of adjustments that 
have been made to account for errors in the original data.  
 
30 From 1960-1970 the types of income included in the sum of net income is: labour income, capital income, real 
estate income, temporary employment, farming and farm property, taxable as wells as sea-related income minus 
deficit in source of income. 
From 1971-1990 the definition of income is the same as in the preceding period, apart from the fact that deficit in 
the source of income is not deducted. From 1991 onwards the definition of income has come to include income 
from labour, economic activity as well as capital surplus   32
taxation has probably had an impact on the decision of women to enter the labour market. 
The two other reforms have given rise to trend breaks, and have been adjusted for. For the 
years 1974-1977 our income inequality measure has been adjusted using information from 
the country level, retrieved from LINDA (longitudinal individual data for Sweden) where the 
definition of income corresponds to that of our data prior to 1974. The inequality measure is 
multiplied with that of the ratio old-income-definition/new-income-definition for the 
aggregate data. For the following years, the data is just multiplied by the value of 1977, so as 
not to create a new trend break.  
 
 The trend break of 1990-1991 has been adjusted using HINK (Hushållsinkomstdata) data 
which provides information on aggregate household income inequality for 1991 and a revised 
version of 1989 based on 1991 tax assessment rules. We set the variation in income 
inequality between 1989 and 1991 equal to that in the HINK.  
 
Various other minor adjustments have been made due to trend breaks which arise due to 
changes in the number of income classes which are at the basis for the inequality measure.   
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Appendix B 
Variable Definition  Source  Additional  information 
y   Ln of per capita taxable 
income for the population 
aged 20 and over, 2000 
year price level, SEK 
Statistics Sweden  See Appendix 
Growth rates  averaged (annual) 1 to 10-
year per capita income 
growth rates  
Statistics Sweden  See Appendix 
Gini  Gini index  Statistics Sweden  See Appendix A 
Theil  Theil’s Entropy Index  Statistics Sweden  See Appendix A 
Q3  Share of the income held by 
the third quintile 
Statistics Sweden  See Appendix A 
College Percentage  of  population 
aged 25-59, with a college 
education 
Population and 
Housing  Census 
(FoB) 1960, 1970, 
1985-2000 
The values for 1961-1969, 1971-
1984 have been interpolated using 
a cubic spline method in a state 
space model. See Harvey and 
Koopman (1999) and Koopman, 
Shephard and Doornik (1998) for a 
thorough description of this 
method. 
Urban 
Share of the population 
living in the county’s 
largest city. 
Statistics Sweden, 
1960, 1970,  1980 , 
1995 & 2000 
The interpolations are done using 




Share of various age groups 
as share of  the adult 




For the intermediate years, the data 
has been linearly interpolated 
Observations have been lagged one 
year since the data is observed Dec 
31.   
Descriptive statistics: 
Variable  Obs       Mean  Std.Dev.     Min    Max 
average income growth rates 
   1-year   960 0.026  0.027  -0.043  0.112 
   3-year   912  0.024  0.020  -0.032  0.075 
   5-year   864  0.023  0.016  -0.017  0.067 
   10-year   744  0.022  0.010  0.003  0.047 
y 960  3.513  0.274  2.732  4.119 
          
gini 960  0.408  0.080  0.307  0.563 
Q3 960  0.165  0.014  0.123  0.194 
Theil’s Index  960  0.363  0.115  0.184  0.645 
          
age_20_34 960  0.277  0.023  0.221  0.348 
age_50_64   960  0.240  0.026  0.174  0.283 
age_65_ 960  0.220  0.032  0.120  0.276 
          
college 960  0.141  0.083  0.017  0.392 
Urban 960  0.268  0.149  0.091  0.753   34
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Appendix C:   Random effects growth regressions - overlapping windows 
 
Table C2: without time dummies 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year 3years  5 years  10 years 
   y   -0.017* -0.050** -0.064** -0.041** 
 (2.08)  (8.39)  (14.38)  (22.05) 
gini 0.250**  0.170**  0.068**  0.010 
 (10.53)  (9.69)  (4.94)  (1.72) 
college 0.156**  0.197**  0.168**  0.051** 
 (6.53)  (11.38)  (11.81)  (6.22) 
urban -0.015*  -0.011*  -0.007  -0.003 
 (2.32)  (2.46)  (1.84)  (1.45) 
age_65+ 0.077  0.061*  0.005  -0.037** 
 (1.81)  (2.06)  (0.24)  (3.43) 
constant 0.087  0.495**  0.720**  0.497** 
 (0.86)  (6.96)  (13.45)  (23.03) 
Obs 960  912  864  744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
 
Table C2: with year dummies 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year 3years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.015* -0.026** -0.037** -0.053** 
 (2.06)  (4.81)  (8.16)  (19.39) 
gini 0.154**  0.180**  0.165**  0.067** 
 (5.84)  (10.18)  (11.77)  (7.62) 
college -0.006  -0.011  -0.010  0.016** 
 (0.36)  (0.98)  (1.05)  (2.71) 
urban 0.002  0.008**  0.013**  0.012** 
 (0.54)  (3.03)  (5.07)  (6.41) 
age_65+ -0.014 0.008  0.014  0.008 
 (0.58)  (0.43)  (0.99)  (0.90) 
constant 0.142  0.239**  0.361**  0.589** 
 (1.56)  (3.56)  (6.58)  (17.66) 
Obs 960  912  864  744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
 
Table C3: with decade dummies  
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.018 -0.057**  -0.073**  -0.024** 
 (1.76)  (7.83)  (14.55)  (11.85) 
gini  0.243** 0.242** 0.164** 0.053** 
  (6.58) (8.94) (8.52) (6.87) 
college  0.249** 0.157** 0.060** 0.026** 
  (7.66) (6.91) (3.73) (3.25) 
urban -0.027**  -0.005  0.008*  -0.003 
  (3.86) (1.09) (2.51) (1.75) 
age_65+ 0.117** -0.007  -0.104**  -0.018 
  (2.61) (0.23) (4.99) (1.72) 
constant 0.087  0.553**  0.794**  0.283** 
 (0.69)  (6.08)  (12.62)  (11.40) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10-years growth periods. Absolute 
value of t-statistics in parentheses . * denotes significance at 5% level and  ** denotes significance at 1% level.  
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Table D1: growth regressions without time dummies - overlapping windows 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.058** -0.099** -0.102** -0.045** 
 (5.56)  (9.43)  (10.46)  (13.63) 
Gini  0.329** 0.258** 0.135** 0.019 
 (10.96)  (9.68)  (6.40)  (1.42) 
college  0.275** 0.338** 0.307** 0.089** 
 (8.86)  (10.57)  (10.55)  (5.44) 
urban  0.116** 0.154** 0.140** 0.015 
  (3.05) (4.32) (4.67) (1.21) 
age_65+ 0.331** 0.364** 0.165  -0.064 
  (3.01) (3.40) (1.93) (1.58) 
constant  0.379** 0.855** 0.992** 0.534** 
 (3.54)  (8.33)  (10.23)  (14.37) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
 
Table D2: growth regressions with year  dummies - overlapping windows 
 Growth  periods 
variable  1year 3years  5  years 10  years 
y   -0.060** -0.069** -0.070** -0.067** 
  (3.20) (5.49) (6.82) (11.15) 
gini  0.270** 0.247** 0.206** 0.072** 
  (4.62) (6.62) (6.81) (3.66) 
College -0.037 -0.050*  -0.037 0.001 
  (1.08) (2.08) (1.92) (0.05) 
urban  0.069** 0.067** 0.058** 0.023** 
  (3.50) (4.04) (4.21) (3.11) 
age_65+  0.076 0.079 0.058 0.026 
  (1.34) (1.91) (1.90) (1.72) 
Constant 0.541*  0.648** 0.696** 0.743** 
  (2.37) (4.28) (5.59) (10.19) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
 
Table D3: growth regressions with decade  dummies - overlapping windows 
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.072** -0.117** -0.118** -0.027** 
 (5.69)  (9.27)  (11.13)  (9.27) 
gini  0.342** 0.358** 0.240** 0.059** 
 (8.04)  (13.39)  (11.77)  (3.77) 
College  0.567** 0.414** 0.223** 0.044** 
 (11.34)  (8.57)  (6.09)  (3.07) 
urban  0.164** 0.194** 0.158** 0.004 
  (4.09) (5.68) (6.50) (0.45) 
age_65+ 0.234*  0.244*  0.072  -0.023 
  (2.07) (2.28) (0.99) (0.72) 
Constant 0.477** 0.986** 1.136** 0.303** 
 (3.48)  (7.58)  (10.10)  (8.46) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr of lan  24  24  24  24 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10-years growth periods. Pooled 
OLS with county dummies. Newey West corrected standard errors, Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses . 
* denotes significance at 5% level and  ** denotes significance at 1% level.    37
Appendix E: Sensitivity analysis with alternative measures of inequality.  
 
Table E1 : Growth regressions without time dummies – overlapping windows 
Fixed effects estimations with Theil’s Entropy index as inequality variable  
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
      
y   -0.051** -0.093** -0.099** -0.045** 
  (4.62)  (12.48) (17.62) (17.96) 
theil  0.213** 0.165**  0.088** 0.017** 
  (11.32) (12.84) (8.84)  (3.75) 
college  0.258** 0.323** 0.299** 0.095** 
  (8.67)  (15.61) (17.04) (7.97) 
urban  0.109** 0.148** 0.137** 0.015 
  (3.01) (6.10) (7.34) (1.71) 
age_65+  0.287** 0.326** 0.151** -0.057* 
  (2.95) (4.85) (2.90) (2.35) 
constant  0.412** 0.901** 1.036** 0.537** 
  (3.55)  (11.42) (17.64) (20.93) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.25 0.44 0.55 0.80 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10 years growth periods. R-squared 
refers to the within-R-squared for fixed effects. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  * denotes 
significance at the 5% and ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table E2 : Growth regressions with year dummies – overlapping windows 
Fixed effects estimations with Theil’s Entropy index as inequality variable  
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
      
y   -0.056** -0.066** -0.068** -0.066** 
  (3.63) (8.19) (12.03)  (22.00) 
theil  0.158** 0.140** 0.115** 0.039** 
  (7.39)  (12.16) (13.66) (8.11) 
college  -0.013 -0.027 -0.019 0.005 
  (0.48) (1.82) (1.72) (0.72) 
urban  0.060** 0.058** 0.051** 0.020** 
  (3.73) (7.05) (8.77) (6.52) 
age_65+  0.064  0.070** 0.052** 0.026** 
  (1.42) (2.96) (3.13) (2.77) 
constant  0.567** 0.679** 0.723** 0.745** 
  (3.21) (7.32) (11.05)  (21.28) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.90 0.96 0.97 0.98 
Notes: See Table E1 
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Table E3 : Growth regressions without time dummies – overlapping windows 
Fixed effects estimations with share of third quintile (Q3) as inequality variable  
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
      
y   -0.043** -0.104** -0.111** -0.032** 
  (3.23)  (10.78) (15.85) (11.73) 
Q3 -0.425**  -0.024  0.139  -0.312** 
  (3.04) (0.23) (1.83) (9.69) 
college  0.169** 0.265** 0.259** 0.078** 
  (4.85)  (11.13) (14.35) (7.98) 
urban  0.129** 0.162** 0.138** 0.024** 
  (3.36) (6.12) (7.08) (2.88) 
age_65+  -0.195*  -0.067 -0.057 -0.051* 
  (2.04) (0.99) (1.11) (2.30) 
constant  0.579** 1.183** 1.241** 0.438** 
  (4.39)  (12.38) (18.01) (16.42) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.15 0.34 0.51 0.82 
Notes: See Table E1 
 
Table E4 : Growth regressions with year dummies – overlapping windows 
Fixed effects estimations with share of third quintile (Q3) as inequality variable  
 Growth  periods 
variable 1year  3years  5 years  10 years 
      
y   -0.093** -0.102** -0.102** -0.078** 
  (6.16)  (12.54) (17.51) (27.15) 
Q3 -0.180*  -0.152**  -0.055  -0.002 
  (2.20) (3.48) (1.78) (0.15) 
college 0.003  -0.027  -0.032**  -0.012 
  (0.10) (1.66) (2.63) (1.73) 
urban  0.052** 0.054** 0.046** 0.018** 
  (3.14) (6.04) (7.11) (5.51) 
age_65+  0.025 0.044 0.038*  0.023* 
  (0.54) (1.74) (2.04) (2.37) 
constant  1.096** 1.180** 1.172** 0.903** 
  (6.64)  (13.28) (18.39) (28.46) 
Obs  960 912 864 744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24 24 
R-squared  0.89 0.95 0.96 0.98 
Notes: See Table E1   39
Appendix F : 2SLS IV  growth regressions - overlapping windows.  































Notes: The dependent variable is annual per capita growth rates in 1,3,5 and 10-years growth 
periods. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Newey West corrected standard errors.* 
denotes significance at 5% level and  ** denotes significance at 1% level. Gini is endogenous, the 
set of instruments used are:y, college, density, age_65+, age_20_34 and age_50_64. Estimated 
using pooled OLS with country dummies.   
 Growth  periods 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.054** -0.099** -0.144  -0.021 
  (4.13) (7.69) (1.31)  (0.99) 
Gini 0.722**  0.251  -2.887  -0.401 
  (5.30) (1.16) (0.43)  (1.24) 
college  0.346** 0.336** -0.973 -0.290 
  (8.43) (5.14) (0.33)  (0.98) 
urban 0.104*  0.154**  0.118  -0.037 
  (2.18) (4.24) (0.47)  (0.62) 
age_65+ 1.109**  0.353  -4.308  -0.554 
  (4.07) (1.00) (0.43)  (1.37) 
constant 0.010  0.862**  3.848  0.614** 
  (0.05) (3.15) (0.60)  (5.63) 
Obs  960 912 864  744 
Nbr  of  counties  24 24 24  24 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   -0.081* -0.088**  -0.079**  -0.049* 
 (2.21)  (3.77)  (4.25)  (2.41) 
Gini 0.138  0.137  0.155  0.181 
 (0.65)  (1.20)  (1.70)  (1.45) 
college -0.017  -0.040  -0.036  0.021 
 (0.33)  (1.50)  (1.85)  (0.69) 
density 0.058*  0.059**  0.054**  0.030* 
 (2.37)  (3.26)  (3.62)  (2.57) 
age_65+ 0.051  0.064  0.053  0.031 
 (0.72)  (1.47)  (1.73)  (1.77) 
constant 0.948  1.031**  0.824**  0.481 
 (1.78)  (3.17)  (3.20)  (1.57) 
Obs 960  912  864  744 
Nbr of counties  24  24  24  24 
variables 1year  3  years  5 years  10 years 
y   0.033 -0.147 -0.098**  -0.028** 
 (0.77)  (1.61)  (5.85)  (5.75) 
Gini 1.826**  0.027  0.475**  0.038 
 (3.49)  (0.03)  (2.77)  (0.72) 
college 0.380**  0.425**  0.245**  0.039* 
 (3.48)  (7.38)  (5.40)  (1.97) 
density 0.220**  0.185**  0.168**  0.004 
 (2.90)  (3.72)  (6.69)  (0.35) 
age_65+ 1.527**  0.032  0.192  -0.033 
 (3.15)  (0.05)  (1.46)  (0.94) 
constant -1.700*  1.543  0.749**  0.331** 
 (2.11)  (0.91)  (2.64)  (4.01) 
Obs 960  912  864  744 
Nbr of counties  24  24  24  24  
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